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In re Parental Rights as to S.M.M.D, 128 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 2 (Jan. 26, 2012)1 
 
INDIAN LAW & FAMILY LAW – PARENTAL RIGHTS 
 
Summary 
 
 The Court considered an appeal from a district court order denying a petition to vacate an 
earlier certification of relinquishment of parental rights. 
 
Disposition/Outcome 
 
 The Court concluded that state and tribal social services adequately complied with the 
applicable Indian Child Welfare Act (“ICWA”) provisions on concurrent jurisdiction in child 
custody termination proceedings. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court’s order 
denying the petition. 
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
 In September 2002, Fallon Paiute Shoshone Tribe (“the tribe”) Social Services division 
removed two children on an emergency basis from their mother, Raena, a tribe member who 
lived on the reservation. The tribe later returned the children, but removed them again in 
December 2003 following a joint investigation by tribe social services and the Nevada 
Department of Child and Family Services (“DCFS”). The children were placed in the custody of 
DCFS because they did not meet blood requirements for membership in the tribe. 
 
 DCFS returned the children, but then removed them for a third time in December 2004, 
following a second joint investigation. In January 2005, the district court placed the children with 
foster parents and created a case plan for Raena. During periodic reviews of the case the 
following year, the district court concluded the Indian Child Welfare Act did not apply because 
the children were not members of the tribe. 
 
 At some point before January 2006, the tribe changed its blood requirements, rendering 
the children eligible for membership. As a result, the district court held the children were “Indian 
children” subject to the ICWA.2 The district court also found Raena had failed to make the 
necessary adjustments. DCFS began to pursue termination of her parental rights and invited tribe 
social services to intervene. The tribe responded by expressing its desire for the termination 
process to continue. In February 2006, the tribal court declared the children wards of the tribe but 
that “legal and physical custody” was concurrent with the State of Nevada and DCFS. 
 
 In December 2006, DCFS petitioned the district court for termination of Raena’s parental 
rights. The following month, the tribal court determined that concurrent custody over the 
children was appropriate and approved the termination petition in state court. In March 2007, 
Raena appeared in state court, with counsel, and voluntarily elected to relinquish parental rights. 
The district court questioned Raena to ensure her relinquishment was knowing, voluntary, and 
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2 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (2006). 
free of undue influence. It then accepted the relinquishment, terminated the father’s parental 
rights, and placed the children with DCFS. 
 
 In June 2007, the district court ordered that custody of the children be returned to the 
Fallon Paiute Shoshone Tribal Social Services. Afterward, the tribal court accepted jurisdiction. 
In March 2008, the tribal court ordered adoption of the children to the respondents, who were not 
the foster parents. Raena had assumed the children’s foster parents would become the adoptive 
parents and, disappointed they did not, asked the court to vacate her relinquishment under the 
ICWA.3 She argued that the state court did not have jurisdiction to accept her relinquishment.  
 
The district court denied the petition, holding that tribal social services and DCFS agreed 
that termination of parental rights should proceed in state court, and that placement of the 
children would proceed in tribal court. Raena appealed the district court’s denial of her petition. 
She argued that: 1) the tribe had exclusive jurisdiction under the ICWA; 2) tribal jurisdiction 
cannot be shared with the state; and 3) the district court’s proceeding did not meet the notice 
requirements in the ICWA and the NRS. 
 
Discussion 
 
 Justice Pickering wrote for the unanimous Court, hearing en banc. The State and the 
adoptive parents (collectively, “the State”) made two arguments. First, the Court lacked 
jurisdiction to hear the appeal because the district court already transferred jurisdiction to the 
tribal court. The Court dismissed this argument, upholding the “truism that a court always has 
jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction.”4 
 
 The State also argued that the district court’s termination proceeding was a continuation 
of the 2005 child dependency proceedings and, therefore not subject to the ICWA. The Court 
dismissed this argument because the status of the children as members of the tribe is up to the 
tribe alone,5 and the tribe extended membership status before the termination hearing. Therefore, 
because the children became “Indian children” before the termination, custody proceedings were 
subject to the ICWA.6 
 
 After addressing the State’s threshold arguments, the Court next turned its attention to 
Raena’s arguments. Raena first argued that ICWA vested exclusive jurisdiction in the custody 
proceedings to the tribe once the children were eligible for tribal membership.7 The Court 
pointed out that section 1919(a) authorizes states and tribes to enter jurisdictional agreements in 
custody proceedings, including agreements for concurrent jurisdiction. Because the record 
showed that DCFS and tribal social services collaborated for several years and agreed to share 
jurisdiction, the Court rejected Raena’s first argument. 
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 Raena’s second argument was that concurrent jurisdiction agreements are only valid 
when shared jurisdiction already exists under section 1911(b). The Court concluded that this 
interpretation would render some of the statutory language meaningless. Furthermore, a reading 
of the statute’s legislative history led the Court to conclude that upholding a tribe’s right to yield 
to state jurisdiction preserves tribal sovereignty. Thus, because the tribe determined that Nevada 
courts were an appropriate forum for the termination proceeding, the Court upheld the district 
court’s jurisdiction. 
 
 Raena’s final argument was that neither Raena, nor the tribe received proper notice of the 
termination proceeding. According to the ICWA, notice must be “by registered mail with return 
receipt requested” to the parent and the tribe.8 The Court rejected this argument because Raena 
participated in the proceeding and the tribe approved it. Therefore, the Court held that both 
parties had actual notice of the proceeding, satisfying the ICWA’s notice requirement.9 
 
Conclusion 
 
 The ICWA, in keeping with the principles of tribal autonomy, allows for concurrent 
jurisdiction agreements between a tribe and the state even when the tribe would have exclusive 
jurisdiction absent an agreement. Since section 1919 of the ICWA authorizes the tribe to 
determine the proper forum for termination proceedings, and the tribe in the instant case 
determined that the Nevada courts were an appropriate forum to exercise such jurisdiction, the 
Court affirmed the district court’s order.  
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